Internment in so-called "enemy countries" was a frequent occurrence in the twentieth century and created significant obstacles for multinational enterprises (MNEs). This article focuses on
Introduction
Internment during wartime is a frequent occurrence. As the historical literature shows, it creates major challenges for internees, the governments of belligerent and neutral states, and humanitarian organizations, such as the Red Cross (Speed, 1990; Stibbe, 2006) . However, it also produces significant obstacles for multinational enterprises (MNEs), which the literature has so far largely ignored. Internment, we argue in this article, is a relevant and frequent form of political risk that historically required MNEs to engage in new strategies to manage operational challenges.
We explore the issue of "internment management" by focusing on the specific situation of German businesspeople interned in British camps in India during both World War I and II.
Given how little has been written about internment as a form of political risk, such an in-depth approach is suitable to identify MNEs' reactions to the issue, the strategies they explored, and the subsequent impact of internment on their business in India. By tracing MNE strategies through both world wars, we show the learning effects and the legacy of previous internment experiences. Based on our admittedly limited case study, we seek to identify major issues and questions for future scholarly research on internment.
India is a particularly relevant and under-researched case for the purpose of exploring the issue of internment management. While the group of internees tended to be diverse in most other countries; internment in India was primarily a business problem, as the majority of internees were employees of foreign MNEs. Most of them were German and Austrian nationals; during WWII some Italians also resided in the camps. Yet, neither Indian history nor business history research have addressed this issue. This is partly because Indian business history focuses strongly on the British-Indian relationship pre-1947 and has given significantly less attention to the fate of MNEs of non-British origin, as Tripathi (2014, p. 6 ) rightly criticizes.
Scholars are slowly starting to fill this void. Japanese historians Kaoru (1990) and Akita (together with White) (2010) trace the relationship between India and Japan, acknowledging the influence of Britain but finding that the economic region also developed independent trading relationships. Arnold (2013) , Dejung (2013) , Lubinski (2015) , and Ramnath (forthcoming), all suggest that India was a free (or almost free) trade area for most of the nineteenth and early twentieth century. As a consequence, there was competition between British companies and multinationals from Switzerland, Germany, France, Japan, and the United States -to name just the countries discussed in the literature so far.
On the issue of MNE's political risk management, India is certainly a case of great importance. As Austin, Davila and Jones (2017) have recently argued, political risk is particularly severe in emerging markets due to their colonial past and institutional inefficiencies.
As a result, both local and foreign companies need to design strategies to deal with political turbulence. However, the existing literature on political risk in India mirrors the focus on the British-Indian relationship in Indian business history more generally and focuses on the biggest political concerns for British companies: rising Indian nationalism. Other forms of political risk in India have rarely been addressed, even though MNEs in India clearly faced a plethora of different political challenges over the course of the twentieth century, in particular if we take Tripathi's call seriously and include MNEs of non-British origin, as for example Dejung and Zangger (2010) and Arnold (2011 Arnold ( , 2013 show. Howell and Chaddick (1994, p. 71) define political risk as "the possibility that political decisions, events or conditions in a country (…) will affect the business environment such that investors will lose money or have a reduced profit margin." Business historians have empirically shown a variety of responses to political risk in different countries around the world. The results in the existing literature can be loosely grouped into at least three sets of strategies that multinationals engaged in: (i) "cloaking" strategies, which introduce changes in the organizational structure to camouflage ultimate ownership, (ii) strategies focused on resilience to political change and continuous negotiations with local decision-makers, and (iii) approaches based on maintaining or increasing legitimacy as a protective shield against political risks. Most organizations, over time, employ a combination of these strategies in their attempt to manage political risks.
The first line of research detailing contributions on cloaking, i.e. the art of concealing ownership, is by far the largest. So far, this set of contributions primarily focuses on political risks originating in Nazi Germany during the interwar and WW II period and deals with organizational responses to these risks. Works by Wubs (2008) , Boon and Wubs (2016) , Kobrak and Wüstenhagen (2006) , Jones and Lubinski (2012) , and Aalders and Wiebes (1996) show that Nazi Germany created risks for both foreign and German MNEs and that companies often responded with a combination of cloaking and decentralization of their organizational structure.
Outside the context of Nazi Germany, MNEs have for long used the same strategy of cloaking and decentralization to avoid for example taxation or penalizing regulation (Donzé and Kurosawa, 2013; Jones and Gomopoulos, 2005; Jones and Storli, 2012) . Similarly, van der Eng (2017) finds that Philips handled the risk of asset confiscation, internment, and exclusion from government contracts in Australia during WWII with a flexible adaptive strategy based on negotiations and resilience. Philips replaced individual employees who were considered a political risk (one of the managers was suspected of being a German spy) and revised production methods to best access government contracts.
Finally, a third group revolves around legitimation strategies to mitigate the impact of political risks. Smith (2016) shows that maintaining legitimacy with stakeholders in the home market can positively affect company survival in (temporarily) hostile host markets. Bucheli and Salvaj (2013) stress the point that changing political conditions may turn strategies designed to increase legitimacy with local stakeholders into liabilities. Gao et al. (2017) emphasize reputation as a meta-resource that can help companies survive politically instable periods in emerging markets and overcome, or even capitalize on, institutional inefficiencies.
None of these previous contributions focuses explicitly on the challenge of internment or explores how MNEs addressed it. This is surprising given the ubiquitous and widespread application of internment in many countries. Numerous MNEs from the Axis faced the challenge of their employees being incarcerated in camps all over the world. Historians have established that the internment of civilians was very common, in particular since WWI. Historian Stibbe (2008, p. 5) argues that although there had been detentions during previous conflicts, such as the Spanish war in Cuba (1896-97), the Boer war in South Africa (1899) (1900) (1901) (1902) , and the Balkan wars , it was precisely in WWI that the internment of civilians became a global phenomenon, undertaken by all belligerent states in all continents. He estimates that overall several hundred thousand civilians were captured and detained during WWI. Several thousand Germans were held in British colonies and in areas occupied by Britain, including camps in Transvaal, Egypt, Singapore, Palestine, and of course India. They joined the thousands of "enemy aliens" detained in Hong Kong, Australia, New Zealand and, after 1917, in the US, China, Siam, Cuba, Brazil, Panama, and Haiti. A smaller number of Germans were also imprisoned by the French in Morocco, the Cameroons, and Togoland (for details on these estimates, see Stibbe, 2006, pp. 7-8) .
To analyse internment as a management challenge for German MNEs in India during the twentieth century, we draw primarily on the detailed corporate archives of three German companies: the electrical company Siemens; the chemical company Bayer, which in 1925 merged with other German chemical firms to form I.G. Farben; and the steel producer Krupp.
We selected these three companies because of all German MNEs they employed the largest number of people stationed and consequently interned in India. We complement the material with archival sources from the German Foreign Office, the German Federal Archives, and the British Library's Asia, Pacific and Africa Collections.
While we acknowledge that comparative perspectives with other MNEs in India or other countries of the colonial global South are extremely valuable, there is unfortunately very little empirical research that explicitly addresses the issue of internment. We draw on the business history of the Swiss trading house Volkart by Dejung (2013) , which offers valuable insights into a Swiss firm in India reacting to the internment of the Germans. Although different in context, Miller's (2015) recent analysis of human resource policies of British MNEs in South America and Sluyterman's (prepublished online 2017) of Dutch MNEs in Indonesia provide details to contextualize some of the decisions German multinationals took in India.
The structure of the article is as follows: Section 2 describes the (sudden and unexpected) internment of German businesspeople in WWI and gives some background on the prior German business in India. Section 3 focuses on the reconstruction of that business after the war and highlights the problem of recruiting qualified labour. Section 4 deals with the outbreak of WWII and the new wave of internment, which the historical actors interpreted within the framework of their previous experience. Section 5 traces the almost immediate reactions from different stakeholders in Germany, including the concerned companies, the larger business community, and the German government. Section 6 focuses on the internees in the camps and gives information on their professional and personal background based on a database of 361 German employees who were interned in India. It then traces the careers of a few selected internees to explore possible long-term consequences of the internment experience. The final section concludes and provides direction for future research.
The German India Business in World War I
WWI came sudden and unexpected for the German business community. At the outbreak of the war, German assets in India were expropriated under the trading with the enemy act.
Several different ordinances and orders addressed the enemy trading issue, stipulating that all hostile foreigners or firms should cease to trade unless licensed by the Government of India. The definition of a hostile firm was comprehensive, including "any company, firm, association, or body of individuals incorporated or not, of which any member or officer is a hostile foreigner" (Government of India Legislative Department, 1915).
Both Siemens and Bayer bore the devastating consequences of this law. Bayer had a wholly-owned subsidiary in India since 1896, which was fully expropriated (Bayer, 1918) .
Siemens conducted most of its business with India from Great Britain, where all its manufacturing facilities were equally seized. As a consequence, the India business came to a complete halt. Moreover, both companies lost important patents and trademarks, which damaged their pre-war competitive position (IG Farben, 1939) .
Shortly after the outbreak of WWI, German nationals in India were gathered in internment camps. The internment camp system of the British Empire operated at both the national and imperial level, with prisoners frequently being transferred between different locations and across national borders (Panayi, 2014, p. 15) . The largest internment camps were in New Zealand, Hong Kong, Singapore, and India (Proctor, 2010, p. 79n13) . The largest Indian internment camp was situated at Ahmednagar, a city in the state of Maharashtra in the Western part of India, about 120 km (75 miles) northeast of Pune and 250 km (155 miles) east of Bombay (see Figure 1) . Camp Ahmednagar had a history as a prisoner-of-war camp. During the Boer war in South Africa (1899-1902) the British shipped around 9,000 prisoners from Africa to Ahmednagar (Great Britain War Office, Maurice, & Grant, 1906, vol. 4, appendix 20 Thormeyer, 1917, pp. 32-33; Probst, 1917, p. 59) . In retrospect, the internees argued that the desire for meaningful occupation was essential to fight the boredom, in particular for the "fresh young men" who had taken on qualified positions overseas to broaden their horizons. However, the longer the internment lasted, the more infrequent the courses became (Probst, 1917, pp. 92-93) .
Wives and children were held at a different internment location in Belgaum, 400
kilometres (248 miles) south of Ahmednagar. In March 1916, after several petitions, the British authorities turned Belgaum into a family camp and held couples and families together (International Committee of the Red Cross and Thormeyer, 1917, pp. 35-39) . Unlike the men, the women were allowed to keep indigenous servants, which became an important marker of status in the colonial society.
The internment experience fundamentally changed the (perceived) status of Germans in India-both in the eyes of outside observers and in the eyes of the Germans themselves. While the Germans had previously felt themselves part of the "white Western elite" in India, they struggled with the new line of distinction based on nationality rather than race. In his report, N.
O. Tera (1939) , who had come for a Hamburg-based rubber company to India, argued that the Germans and Austrians were expelled from these clubs and the doors remained closed to them even after the war (Consulate Calcutta, 1930) .
Some internees resisted the perceived loss of status and actively fought for their belonging to the colonial elite, for example by insisting on a European diet and engaging in recreational activities that highlighted their belonging to this privileged class. At the Ahmednagar camp, a group of affluent internees even built two tennis courts; an activity criticized by others as unpatriotic because tennis was considered a typical pastime of the British upper class (Probst, 1917, p. 61) . The conflict between the internees illustrates the change in the interpretation of the category "European" and the new lines of distinction based on nationality rather than race. While the internment conditions in India were overall rather favourable in terms of nutrition, health, and control over personal time, the German internees' major affliction was their exclusion from the privileged community of Western businesspeople.
On 19 
Staffing Problems while Reconstructing the India Trade
Despite the travel ban, after the end of the war, German firms were eager to once again access the Indian market, not least because it was one of the few foreign markets that remained accessible to them. While France, Britain, and the US introduced protectionist policies against Hamburg" (Bayer Archives, 1921) . Other businesspeople reported Sikh buyers roaming the country to purchase much-needed goods for sale in India (Lohmann, 1934, p. 43) .
Indians turned to Germany because they saw a potential partner with similar anti-British feelings; and Germans looked to India as a promising accessible market, which was open to German engagement. In this environment, both Siemens and Bayer were swift in rebuilding their business. To circumvent the travel ban, both companies started working and cooperating with the Italian company Gorio Ltd., which had offices in Bombay and Calcutta as well as initially in
Karachi and had tight connections with the local colonial administration (Siemens, 1922 (Tammen, 1978, p. 195) . To conceal ultimate ownership, I. G. Farben engaged in a secret contract with a Dutch cover firm, Havero, which conducted the business with British India, Burma, and Ceylon. It was not until 1938 that I. G.
Farben founded wholly-owned and locally incorporated subsidiaries in India again.
One of the biggest challenges for both Siemens and I. G. Farben was finding and controlling qualified staff. After WWI and the internment in India, most German businesspeople with experience in India had returned home. "Only few of the old India experts have found their way back here," reported the German consul in Bombay Karl Kapp in 1927 (German Federal Archives, 1927 . Work in India came with great responsibility. The tasks that managers abroad had to cope with were hard to standardize and changed frequently. As communication and transport were slow and often unreliable, it was hard to supervise these far-away agents. In 1924,
Hermann Reyss (1924) , head of the Siemens' overseas administration, stressed the need for independently acting employees in overseas offices. "The management of an overseas office requires extraordinary independence and initiative. We cannot guide these gentlemen via regulations and circular letters, and even the men in second and third row must possess similar qualities." That this was not an easy task shows the example of the Siemens India office, for which top manager de Rziha complained in 1926 that "the performance is not such as can be expected in all fairness." In the future, he suggested, employees should get the opportunity to work in a variety of fields before being sent abroad (De Rziha, 1926) .
Recognizing the challenge of labour management, Siemens' overseas administration had its own human resource department before the 1920s (Siemens Archives, undated while Indians were supposed to get cheaper tickets).
However, these practices increasingly came under pressure. The Swiss company Volkart introduced bonus payments for its Indian employees around the turn of the century, and since 1916 offered old-age pensions (Dejung, 2013, pp. 210-221) . Siemens manager Eduard Beha was called out on not hiring Indian engineers and clerks during a visit to the Lahore office in 1931.
He admitted to having been hesitant in the past but stressed that "good engineers and managers, independently if Europeans or Indians, should always have the best prospects in our company."
(Siemens (India) Ltd., 1931). Siemens was not alone in its initial reluctance to consider locals for higher qualified jobs. Although labour was numerically abundant in India, skilled labourers were hard to find. The British Trade Commissioner for India (1919, p. 19) highlighted the lack of skilled mechanics and pointed out that "industrial success will be in spite of, rather than on account of, the low paid labour." The high cost of skilled labour has even been interpreted as one reason why India remained inclined to small-scale traditional manufacturing during the first half of the twentieth century (Roy, 2006, pp. 235-237) .
The increasing and unmet demand triggered slow and moderate changes, which were reinforced by the improving political and cultural relations between India and Germany (Manjapra, 2014) . In the context of rising sales numbers for both Siemens and I. G. Farben in the mid-1930s (see, Table 1 and Table 2 ), hiring Indians in qualified posts slowly became more common. In particular Indian engineers could exploit new opportunities (Overseas HR Department, 1934; 1938 (Steffens 1939a; 1939b) . 4 The shortage of high-skilled talent was further reinforced by the instability of the international monetary system since the 1930s, which made relocation less attractive for German engineers. In 1931, the British pound departed from the gold standard, while the German Reichsmark remained pegged to gold. Consequently, the Indian rupee depreciated relative to the Reichsmark (see , Table 3 ). Employees overseas were paid in the local currency. Siemens' overseas human resource department reported that due to the fact that overseas employees could no longer accumulate substantial savings, which had been a common practice for many of the young Germans working in India, engineers showed little interest in relocating (Overseas HR Department, 1938) . Throughout the interwar years, staffing challenges dominated the managerial agenda of German MNEs in India, thus creating a context, in which any employment issue, in particular one as severe as internment, had to be taken very seriously.
The Outbreak of WWII and A New Wave of Internment
WWII began with the German invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939. Two days later Britain and France declared war on Germany. That very night German nationals in India were interned as enemy aliens once again, 25 years after the WWI internment (Overseas HR Department, undated) . In most parts of India, all male Germans were arrested, even if they were beyond military age or Jews who had previously fled to India to escape persecution in Germany. The only exception was the province of Calcutta, where Jews remained free for the time being (Schoberth, 1940) . Approximately 900 men were arrested and deported either directly to camp Ahmednagar, or via smaller camps, such as Fort Williams in Calcutta (Pazze, 1939; Schoberth, 1940; Weingarten, 1939) . In hindsight, one observer remarked: "The comfortable and secured life of these people changed abruptly on the day of the internment." (Urchs, 1948, p. 181 ).
Women and children were not among these prisoners of the first hour. The police expropriated their cars, radios, cameras, and binoculars; other private property remained untouched. The women were allowed to sell those assets to cover their living expenses (Luitpold, 1940 GBP) for internees were needed (Luitpold, 1940) . Indeed, household budgets were much depleted for the women and children that remained outside of internment camps. German managers had previously received 1,500 to 2,500 INR (or 112.5 to 187.5 GBP) monthly, as reported before. Making ends meet with 140 INR (c.10.5 GBP) for a woman with two children would have required significant changes in lifestyle.
The legal basis for the internment was the Registration of Foreigners Act, 1939, in combination with the Foreigners Order and Enemy Foreigners Order (UNHCR, 2018 (UNHCR, [1939 ).
The first internment camp was situated once again in Ahmednagar. Given the previous history of this camp during both the Boer War and WWI, some Germans experienced a déjà-vu upon arrival "at the exact same spot where the old German prisoners of war were held 25 years ago." (Luitpold, 1940) . While all Germans interned during WWI had returned to Germany after the war, some later came back to India to engage once more in business there. The most unfortunate individuals-for example Sydney Schüder (born 1893) 5 who came to India for Schering-were interned twice at Ahmednagar, once during WWI and again during WWII.
The Germans were brought to Ahmednagar by train. Upon arrival, they had to walk from the train station to the camp over a distance of approximately 8 kilometres (4.9 miles), which became one of the most reported traumatic events of the internment experience. Similar to WWI, some internees again highlighted the embarrassment of being supervised by "coloured" (Sikh)
soldiers. Otto Zimmer (1939) , the commercial attaché and Nazi Party supporter, stressed that "in the Indian context this [being supervised by Sikhs] is a massive humiliation for the Europeans."
Drawings, which selected internees made during their internment, emphasized the race difference between the white German businessmen, often depicted as slightly overweight and oddly misplaced in the camp, and their dark-skinned guards in a tropical environment ( Figure 2 and Figure 3 ). Krupp, Schering-Kahlbaum, and Hansa India. They discussed a support scheme and decided to distinguish the employees of German companies from "other" German nationals in internment, who would receive less or no support (Orient Verein, 1939a). They also planned for a letter to be sent to all German firms with business in India to collect financial aid. The letter highlighted that the support scheme had nothing to do with charity but rather would guarantee that the employees were available to reconstruct German business in India after the war, highlighting the need for a long-term strategy that could bridge over politically turbulent times (Orient Verein, 1939e ).
Reactions in Germany
Finally, Waibel was assigned the task to request special permission for sending money to India, in the context of Germany's strict foreign exchange controls (For context, see Tooze, 2007, pp. 71-86 (Bayer Archives, 1941; Orient Verein, 1940b) .
While the affected companies in Germany debated possible support schemes, businesspeople, who had experienced internment in India during WWI, lobbied for more engagement. C. W. Kuehns (1939) of the Hamburg-based rubber company Phoenix addressed Hermann Waibel directly and expressed his hope "that one learned from previous events."
Reflecting on the entire quarter century since the last internment he argued, "It has been hard enough after the previous war to get back onto foreign markets, and if we don't show our employees abroad a warm heart, we later won't find anyone anymore who is willing to go abroad to represent German interests." (Kuehns, 1939) . Comparative perspectives were plentiful. One of Kuehns' biggest worries was the fact that at the outbreak of WWI many older and relatively affluent businesspeople ended up in internment and were able to bring some of their private money. "This time it is a very young colony with young assistants who do not have large financial reserves." (Kuehns, 1939) . Due to similar concerns, the AEG had paid out three monthly salaries to all unmarried employees and six monthly salaries to the married ones just before the war broke out. By November, the Special Committee had identified 236 employees as being interned (Bayer Archives, 1944; Orient Verein, 1939c (Mensendieck, Kruse and Kuehns, 1940) .
They also asked the Special Committee to include at least one former internee in their meetings to rely on his local knowledge and experience. The committee appointed Wolf Sthamer from
Hamburg, who was interned at Ahmednagar in World War I, and a nephew of the former German ambassador in England (Waibel, 1940) .
The Community of Internees and its Legacy
Based on archival sources from different corporate and German government archives, we captured German sailors and the re-interned Jews and missionaries that had remained in India) (Sauvage, 1942; German Foreign Office, 1941b) . We cross-checked our database against individual lists of German companies and the German Foreign Office as well as address lists of internees, which were used to remain in touch after the war.
Information on age was available for 236 (65%) of the 361 internees with the average being 34.45 years, as reported above. Marital status could be identified for 229 (63%). The group splits fairly evenly between husbands (111, 48.5%) and bachelors (118, 51.5%). The internees worked for a variety of German companies (see Table 4 ). The biggest employers were I. G.
Farben (51 internees) and Siemens (36) . Of the 236 internees for which an educational background or position was mentioned in the sources, the vast majority were sales people (88) and engineers (48) followed by technicians and mechanics (18).
Most German nationals resided in Bombay (93) and Calcutta (56) followed by Madras (17), Jamshedpur (10) -where the Tata Iron and Steel Company was located-and Lahore (10).
While concentration in the big commercial centres of India is not surprising, it is interesting to note that German businesspeople did not exclusively live in these areas but rather spread out over the vast Indian subcontinent, with one or two representatives of German firms present in many smaller cities in India (see Table 5 and Figure 1 ). For 183 internees (50.7%), the sources reveal when they first arrived in India. On average they had spent 3.78 years in the country prior to their internment. The veteran was the technician Otto Engelmann of I. G. Farben (born 1902) who first came to India in 1924. A total of 41 businesspeople had arrived only a few months prior to being arrested.
The internees also varied according to political leaning, which was reflected in the structure of the internment camp. The camp was divided in A and B camp. At the A camp, prisoners paid 3 INR (c.0.23 GBP) daily for better food and accommodation (Schoberth, 1940; Osten, 1940) . Internally, the B camp was considered the "Nazi camp," with the argument that not paying any money to the British was a contribution to Germany's war efforts. Foreign Organization had an extensive network of local clubs around the world and gave out centralized guidelines on how to mobilize Germans abroad (Jacobsen, 1968, p. 44 ).
The most frequent complaints about the camp conditions focused on nutrition. However, they were not addressing quantity but rather quality, based on the argument that the kitchen staff was Indian. The German internees rejected their cooking and eventually took over the preparing of the meals themselves (Bayer Archives, 1944; Orient Verein, 1939b) . Like the attempts during WWI to sustain an elite European identity and distinguish themselves from the local population, the complaints over food preparation can be interpreted as a set of efforts to maintain (some) racial distinction from the Indian staff.
German women were not interned but had to live within much more moderate means.
They started combining households to cut down on the living expenses (Orient Verein, 1940a).
They lived off their savings, some support money, and the earnings from selling furniture and household items (Kopp, 1940) . The British-Indian intelligence bureau, jointly run by the India Office and the Government of India, suspected some of them of engaging in espionage and spreading propaganda: " […] with the internment of their men-folk, German women in this country are finding scope for intelligence work." (Public and Judicial Dept., 1939a: 184; on propaganda see also, Public and Judicial Dept. 1939b: 201) . In particular Oswald Urchs' wife was said to exercise control over other German women and collect information on the political leanings of their husbands, which she reported back to her husband in internment (Public and Judicial Dept., 1939a: 184) .
At the camp, a commission of British officials started interrogating each individual internee to determine their level of support for the Nazi government. As a consequence, between
December 1939 and March 1940, approximately 600 Jews were released from internment (Schoberth, 1940) . The Jewish Relief Association, founded in 1934 in Bombay, had lobbied with the Government of India to free the Jewish internees and also provided them support during internment (Public and Judicial Dept., 1944; Tucher, 1980, p. 108) . By May 1940, the official list of the Swiss authorities counted 324 internees, of which 220 had been identified by German companies as their employees (Sauvage, 1942) . Some observers speculated that the Commission's additional purpose was to identify the links between German businesspeople and Indian nationalist circles (Anonymous 1941; Tucher, 1980, p. 113) . By the end of May and in early June, as the war intensified, the British authorities re-interned many of the formerly released and put women and children under house arrest. By September, the number of German as Oswald Urchs reported in hindsight, the camp and the move "were seen as a humiliation, an abasement." (Urchs, 1948, p. 187) . As a consequence, the internees went on a hunger strike, which lasted 112 hours (Urchs, 1948, p. 188) .
In October Throughout the entire internment period (with the exception of the first months in Deolali) the prisoners reported that they were held under favourable conditions. They were not forced to work but could engage in activities, such as theatre, educational course work, gardening, and even mountaineering, for which internees could leave the camp for up to nine hours and hike in the surrounding areas (Urchs, 1948, pp. 194-204) . Prisoners explicitly discouraged parties at home from sending packages with food or hygiene articles, arguing that they had adequate access to these items. However, books were highly appreciated and were used for self-studies at the camp (See letters and reports in German Foreign Office, 1941). As during WWI, regular classes were organized by the internees for internees (Rolshoven, 1944) . The longer the internment lasted, the more psychologically challenging it became. In July 1942, internee Grauthoff (1942) expressed the "bitter thought of having been forgotten" and worried
that German companies at home may have lost interest in them given that they were experts for countries that may no longer be accessible after the war.
World War II in India officially ended on 7 May 1945, with the surrender of the Nazis in Europe. However, the internees in British-India were not released until November 1946, when they travelled back to Germany and reached Hamburg on 26 December 1946. From there, they
were immediately moved to a transit camp at the location of the former concentration camp Neuengamme, where they were interrogated about their political leanings and past activities. A few were held back at Neuengamme for their track record of having supported the Nazi party (Tucher, 1980, pp. 486-500) .
The camp experience-while psychologically and physically challenging-also provided a unique opportunity for German businesspeople to network. The 300 to 400 German businessmen in India had close social ties as a comparatively small expat community. The internment experience (and the financial support scheme organized by the companies and the German government) reinforced those ties. Due to the tight currency restrictions, the support scheme relied partly on well-off internees supporting their fellow compatriots, which required both trust in the company back home to reimburse these expenses and close personal ties. Wives and children, who initially remained free, for some time shared households to make ends meet and thus built very close relationships with each other.
Interestingly, internment in India also created inter-generational ties beyond the group of people sharing the barracks at the same time. Internees from WWI, when hearing about the renewed internment in India, organized and lobbied for support with both German employers and the German authorities. They stressed the importance of ongoing company support in particular in India, where skilled labour was so scarce.
The social networks created at the camp did not dissolve after the internees returned back to Germany. Many of them stayed in touch. Medical doctor Oswald Urchs was able to do a follow-up study on his former malaria patients. Of 172 patients who he examined during the camp time, he managed to reconnect with 71 in the years 1954/55, to re-examine them and analyse long-term problems after a malaria episode (Urchs, 1958 (Steffens, 1947) .
Conclusion
Indian business history has a strong focus on British-Indian business and political relations before Indian independence in 1947. This scholarship studied selected industries and topics, for which the British-Indian relationship is of greatest significance. However, India as a market and trading partner was also attractive to multinationals beyond the British Empire. Their experience in India not only complements existing accounts on corporate strategies in India but helps us better understand Indian business within the wider world economy addressing new topics, such as political risk. As we show in this paper, the threat of internment was one such risk.
India was politically a high-risk country. MNEs of all origins saw their business being affected by Indian government policies, e.g. tariffs, taxation and nationalism. Across the period we see German MNEs adopting a mix of political risk management strategies to ensure longterm survival in India. In line with results of the previous political risk literature, they engaged in concealing ownership, negotiating with governments, and developing legitimacy and resilience.
During wartime, companies from enemy countries were particularly challenged by property expropriations and the internment of their expatriate employees. So far, the experience of businesspeople in internment is a gap in international business history, in India and elsewhere.
WWI and the first wave of civilian internment was a turning point, which triggered corporate strategies for dealing with this challenge. In India, the problem was not so much the material deprivation that internment entailed. Prisoners were in fact relatively well treated, especially when compared to the experience of internment elsewhere in the historical record. However, internment impacted business relationships in India well beyond its endpoint, in at least three ways.
First, it aggravated the broader problems and risks that MNEs faced when it came to staffing their operations abroad. In India in particular, talent was scarce and German MNEs worried about the long-term effects of internment on their ability to recruit and retain European nationals for their business. These facts explain the swift reaction by German MNEs in WWII and the immediate rise of a public-private partnership between companies and the German government. The relationship between staffing challenges and political risk is an important issue that is less explored so far and requires further research by international business historians.
Second, the internment of German businesspeople was crucial for understanding the development of German-Indian business relations in the interwar and post-war period.
Specifically, it was the symbolic and political importance that internment represented that mattered. For many Germans, the humiliating internment experience first challenged the idea of a cohesive "Western white community" in India. In the colonial society, Germans had previously understood themselves as part of this community. With the outbreak of WWI, however, the categories of "nationality" and "enemy alien" trumped racial belonging, drawing a new line of distinction between German and British businesspeople.
On the flipside, the outbreak of the wars and the public internment of German expats signalled to Indian nationalists that there was no homogenous Western interest and that the Germans could be seen as victims of British power as well. Indians actively sought German partners, who had similar levels of technical expertise than the British but came with less political "baggage."
Internment thus helped to disintegrate the conception of white business elite in India, not by eliminating racial prejudices among the Germans but by signalling to Indian observers that the "European" business community was more diverse than previously assumed. It shattered the belief in a cohesive white Western community in India, creating new lines of division and belonging in the relationship between Germany, India, and Great Britain. As the article shows, internment was a major blow to German's own sense of status vis-à-vis the British because it broke apart the idea of a cohesive Western whiteness of status. Even more importantly it opened the eyes of Indians to the possibility of seeing the Germans as fellow victims of British aggression.
Finally, the challenge of internment created unexpected learning and networking opportunities within the German business community, which research has ignored so far. In India, the centralized internment camps provided a framework for a community of businessmen to establish dense social links. Interestingly, the emotional and memorable internment experience even created inter-generational connections between individuals that were not interned at the same time. The generation of WWI internees spoke up for the internees during WWII, lobbying the German government to get more involved. The explorative study of German business in British India shows that the internment episodes in WWI and WWII have to be analysed together to understand actors' perceptions of this particular challenge. German WWI internees provided a frame of reference for the interpretations during WWII; and were indeed employed by the German government as consultants. Only the full sequence of events allows us to see the emerging community of internees, bound together by an asynchronous experience.
The case of the German business community in India is but one example of internment as a management issue; follow-on studies for other geographies and time periods will be required to explore the issue of internment more broadly and engage in much needed comparative perspectives. Highlighting the strategies of a non-British business community, moreover, stresses that MNEs' experience in India differed significantly depending on country-of-origin, questioning the widely-used category "European business" and instead pleading for a more nuanced analysis. 
